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cha p t e r 8
Grounds, Modality, and Nomic Necessity
in the Critical Kant
Michela Massimi
8.1 Nomic Necessity and the Kantian Problem of Inference
The natural world is characterized by a lawful order and harmony. Tides
occur at regular intervals, the lunar cycle is 29.5 days, and chemical
substances have atomic numbers that explain a variety of their physico-
chemical properties. Laws of nature seem to govern the natural world and
to explain its robust regularities. Given Newton’s law of gravity, and given
the masses of the Earth and the Moon and their respective alignment, high
tide necessarily follows. Given the laws of chemistry, the properties of aqua
regia, and of gold, if thrown in aqua regia, gold necessarily dissolves.
Nomic necessity suggests that laws of nature go beyond Humean
regularities and capture a robust modal thought: if C had been the case,
necessarily E would have been the case. Modality has traditionally been
invoked to distinguish between laws of nature and accidentally true
universal generalizations such as “All fruits in Smith’s garden are apples,”
where it is not a law of nature that were a seed thrown in Smith’s garden,
necessarily an apple tree would grow out of it.
How did Kant explain lawlike claims such as “Were the Earth and
Moon aligned in a given way, high tide would necessarily occur”? In the
Critique of Pure Reason Kant famously stated that the categories are
concepts that prescribe laws a priori to nature “as the sum total of all
appearances (natura materialiter spectata)” (B163). He then presented “a
riddle” (I am henceforth going to call it the Kantian problem of inference).
Namely, how can nature possibly follow the a priori laws that the
understanding prescribes to it?
Since the categories are not themselves derived from nature, nor do they
follow nature’s patterns (otherwise they would be empirical and not a
priori), it would seem preposterous to expect them to have any purchase
on nature itself. This is the “riddle,” as Kant outlined it. Nonetheless, we
are told that the faculty of understanding prescribes laws to nature. Let us
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state the problem more precisely. The Kantian problem of inference takes
the following form:
(I) All alterations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of
cause and eﬀect (Second Analogy).
(II) Event of type A (e.g., alignment of the Moon and the Earth) causes
event of type B (e.g., high tide occurring – empirical causal law).1
(III) Event A1 causes event B1 (e.g., this particular Moon–Earth align-
ment today causes high tides at Cramond Island at 11:35 a.m. –
instantiated empirical causal law).
(IV) A1 occurs.
(V) B1 necessarily follows (necessity of eﬀects, via I, II, and III).
For Kant, I argue, the causal connection at work in lawlike claims seems to
follow this inferential pattern, which takes us from pure principles of the
understanding such as (I) to speciﬁc events (i.e., V) via type–token
empirical causal laws (II and III). The Kantian problem of inference2 is
the problem of how to proceed from a general premise such as Kant’s
Second Analogy of Experience (I) to the conclusion that necessarily high
tide occurs at Cramond Island at 11:35 this morning (V), given that the
Earth and Moon are aligned in a particular way today (IV).
The Kantian problem of inference is twofold. First, if the understanding
prescribes laws to nature, lawfulness seems to be restricted to phenomena as
objects of possible experience, and it does not extend to things in them-
selves. Thus, it would seem that the understanding prescribes laws to nature
in a purely formal sense (qua natura formaliter spectata), that is, when nature
is considered with respect to our formal conditions of the possibility
1 There is a debate on how to interpret the Second Analogy (i.e., with a weak reading, “every event has
a cause,” or a strong reading, “same event, same cause”). Here and in what follows, I understand the
Second Analogy as implying the stronger reading “same event, same cause” (primarily defended by
Guyer 1987).
2 The terminology “problem of inference” is coined by van Fraassen 1989 in his critical treatment of
David Armstrong’s Necessitarian account of laws. In van Fraassen’s use, the problem of inference is
the problem of how to move from a necessitation relation between universal properties such as
N (F-ness, G-ness) to the necessitation relation that is supposed to hold at the level of particulars
N (Fa, Ga); N (Fb, Gb); and so on. I borrow the terminology, although – it should be clear from the
passage above – the Kantian version of the problem of inference concerns how to go from a kind of
necessity captured by the Second Analogy in its determination of the connection of appearances to
the necessity that is supposed to hold in nature between events that we come to know via the
Analogies of Experience, and more in general via the categories of the understanding. Thus, the
Kantian problem of inference is even more pressing than its Armstrongian counterpart because it is
the problem of explaining how to infer the necessity of particular lawful events in nature from the
necessary determination of the connection of appearances that our faculty of understanding makes
possible.
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of experience. But the understanding would not prescribe laws to nature in
any material sense, that is, in the sense of delivering on the promise of
answering the question about how laws of nature can have a purchase on
nature itself. Let us call this the metaphysical quandary of the Kantian
problem of inference. The metaphysical quandary is not going to dissolve
by appealing to transcendental idealism or the objective validity of the
categories of the understanding. The thought of a purely formal nature
being dependent on us, so that the necessity of eﬀects would almost
analytically follow from the causality expressed by the Second Analogy, is
of course tempting in this context. But if this were indeed Kant’s ﬁnal and
considered answer to the problem of inference, it would be bad news.
Recall our key question is: how did Kant explain lawlike claims such as
“Were the Earth andMoon aligned in a given way, high tide would necessarily
occur”? If it turns out that Kant’s considered answer to this question (and
similar ones) is that the understanding prescribes laws to nature qua sum of
appearances that are (precisely because appearances) dependent on us, then it
might well be possible that no tide will actually occur at the next Earth–
Moon alignment (or that no tide would in fact ever have occurred at any
Earth–Moon alignment) had it not been for our faculty of understanding
imposing the Second Analogy on a relevant group of appearances.
Yet our key question has metaphysical import. It enjoins us to think
that were the Earth and Moon aligned in a given way, high tide would
necessarily occur (and indeed, it would necessarily occur even if there were
no human beings advancing knowledge claims about tides and their law-
like occurrences). This is what I call the metaphysical quandary of the
Kantian problem of inference.
Second, in the relevant passage of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant is
adamant that “Particular laws, because they concern empirically deter-
mined appearances, cannot be completely derived from the categories,
although they all stand under them. Experience must be added in order to
come to know particular laws at all; but about experience in general, and
about what can be cognized as an object of experience, only those a priori
laws oﬀer instruction” (B165). Thus, it is not the case that the empirical
laws of magnetism, or this particular causal law about tides (II), or any
other, can be derived from the Second Analogy of Experience.
Instead, as Kant puts it, empirical causal laws simply “stand under” the
categories and their principles, for example, the Second Analogy. I suggest
that we see (II) as an instantiation of the general cause–eﬀect template
captured by the Second Analogy (I), pretty much as (III) is an instantiation
of (II), in turn. Experience plays a role in our knowledge of these diﬀerent
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instantiations in a way that we need to clarify in the rest of this chapter.
How can we then come to cognize the necessity of eﬀects (V) as following
from the general principle of causality expressed by (I)? Necessity attaches
to the principle of causality via the Postulates of Empirical Thinking in
General, which do not add anything to the content of the categories but
only express “the cognitive power whence it [concept] arises and has its seat”
(A234/B287). It is then unclear how one can claim to cognize the necessity of
empirical causal laws, which can be derived neither from the
understanding a priori nor from experience a posteriori. Let us call this
the epistemological quandary of the Kantian problem of inference.
To answer both quandaries, I suggest we turn our attention to Kant’s
discussion of grounds and modality and delve into Kant’s lectures on
metaphysics so as to acquire a better grasp of his considered view on the
nomic necessity of the laws.3 My ﬁnal goal is to oﬀer an account of
the necessity of the laws of nature that I hope can make some progress
on the Kantian problem of inference.
8.2 Three Kinds of Grounds and Three Kinds of
Necessity in Kant
In this section, I turn to Kant’s lectures on metaphysics to clarify why, in my
view, Kant’s considered answer to the problem of inference should be
searched for in his multifaceted notion of ground and consequence. I clarify
three diﬀerent kinds of nomic necessity that Kant saw at play in diﬀerent
kinds of laws, each respectively relying on a diﬀerent notion of ground, qua
conceptual ground (“ratio cognoscendi”), qua ground of being (“ratio essendi”),
or qua ground of becoming (“ratio ﬁendi”). Only the latter notion captures
cause–eﬀect relations at play in empirical causal laws, I argue.
InMetaphysik Mrongovious (written around 1782–1783),4 Kant called the
relation of ground and consequence a connection “nexus” and distin-
guished between analytic or logical connection – as that “according to
3 In a seminal paper on Kant’s answer to Hume, Paul Guyer (2003a) has argued that since for Kant
every judgment has a relation (it is either categorical or hypothetical), in the case of hypothetical
judgments of the form “if p then q” Kant deployed the logical relation of ground and consequence
without either clearly distinguishing it from the relation of cause and eﬀect or including it in the table
of categories. In what follows, I expand on Guyer’s distinction between grounds and causes so as to
achieve a better grasp of both the metaphysical and epistemological quandary at stake in the Kantian
problem of inference.
4 Kant did not leave his own lecture notes on metaphysics; all we have left is notes taken by his
students. What is striking about these notes is the overlap of themes over the years and in notes taken
by diﬀerent students, so we can be conﬁdent enough that they reﬂect Kant’s genuine and sustained
thoughts on the matter.
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the principle of identity” – and what he called synthetic or real connec-
tion – “if it is not according to this principle” (29:807). Connections rest
on grounds, which in turn can be either logical grounds or real grounds,5
depending on whether something is posited according to the principle of
identity or not.6 For example,
extension is a ground of divisibility, the latter is posited through the
former according to rules of identity, – but: every body has attractive
power, here the latter is posited through the former (body), but not
according to the rules of identity, and this connection <nexus> is real,
the former logical. It is possible to cognize a real connection <nexus> only
a posteriori. (29:807)
Mark these words. Kant starts with a general logical deﬁnition of ground as
“that which, having been posited, another thing is posited determinately,
the consequence is that which is not posited unless something else is
posited” (29:808). Logical grounds underpin logical connections, that is,
connections “according to the principle of identity.” I suggest reading
logical grounds as cognitive grounds, or rationes cognoscendi, as when we
infer divisibility from extension (or freedom from the moral law, see CPrR
5:004).7 More precisely, I suggest that we understand logical grounds as
conceptually determining grounds (qua ratio cognoscendi) that deliver rules
for inferring a conceptual consequence once a conceptual ground is
posited. Using contemporary language, one might say that, for Kant, to
be conceptually necessary is to be true in virtue of the nature of the concepts
involved. Thus, the concept of a body’s divisibility is grounded in the
concept of a body’s extension. Logical grounds qua conceptually determin-
ing grounds are inferentially deployed in lawlike judgments of the form:
(i) Necessarily, if bodies are extended, they are divisible.
5 For a seminal analysis on real grounds, see Watkins 2005 and Warren 2001.
6 Kant develops this distinction further in Metaphysik L2 (dating back to 1790–1791), where he cashes
out the distinction between logical grounds and real grounds as the distinction between “the relation
of cognition, how one is inferred from the other” and the analogous relation in metaphysics where
“ground belongs under the concept of causality” (28:548). In both cases, grounds bring along with
them necessary connections with their consequences: “if I posit the ground, then a consequence
must follow necessarily. A ground is that whereby, when it is posited, another thing is determinately
posited <ratio est id, quo posito determinate ponitur aliud>” (28:549).
7 “Now we have a criterion of the ground, namely: that which, having been posited determinately,
another is posited <quo posito determinate, ponitur aliud>. Determinately <determinate> means
according to a general rule <secundum regulam generalem>. Every ground gives a rule, therefore the
connection <nexus> of the ground and the consequence is necessary. (Logical ground is a cognition
from which another follows according to a rule)” (29:808).
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The necessity captured by (i) is what Kant calls the necessity according to
the principle of identity for logical connections. We may want to call it
conceptual necessity. That Kant saw (i) as expressing a conceptually neces-
sary truth is clear from his pre-Critical defense of John Keill’s theorem for
the inﬁnite divisibility of the space that bodies ﬁll (with related geometrical
demonstration) in Physical Monadology (PM 1:478).8
Conceptual necessity should not be confused with the necessity at play
in theoretical identity statements, which take syntactically a form akin to
(i) but express a very diﬀerent kind of necessity:
(ii*) Necessarily, if something is water, then it is H2O.
(ii**) Necessarily, if something is gold, then it has atomic number 79.
Or closer to Kant:
(ii ***) Necessarily, if a body has repulsive force, it is impenetrable.
Theoretical identity statements are necessary a posteriori, according to a very
inﬂuential contemporary Kripkean account, because they deliver know-
ledge about the essence of things, and such knowledge is a posteriori (i.e.,
it is the result of a scientiﬁc discovery). Thus, in this sense the necessity of
theoretical identity statements is not the necessity with which Kant’s
logical grounds qua rationes cognoscendi inferentially lead to their conse-
quents: an experimental discovery is required to come to know that water
is H2O or that matter is impenetrable in virtue of its repulsive force.
9 The
necessity of theoretical identity statements is the necessity that attaches to
the essence of water, the essence of gold, or the essence of matter, and for
which, I suggest, we need to resort to another tool in Kant’s arsenal,
namely, grounds of being, or rationes essendi.
Kant’s discussion of grounds of being is scant and not very illuminating.
Ratio essendi sits uncomfortably between logical grounds and (proper) real
grounds as grounds of becoming (ratio ﬁendi). In what follows, I give my
own (arguably fallible) reading of Kant on grounds of being and grounds of
8 The notion of ratio cognoscendi features already in the 1755 pre-Critical text New Elucidation but in a
slightly diﬀerent way. For it is there identiﬁed with what Kant calls “consequently determining
reason,” which is one of the two possible expressions of the Leibnizian principle of suﬃcient reason
(or better, principle of determining reason, as Kant calls it), rather than just a logical ground as in the
aforementioned quotes from the much later, Critical-period metaphysics lectures.
9 Odd as it might sound to our contemporary ear, Kant regarded impenetrability as an essential
property of bodies as much as we would now regard atomic number 79 an essential property of gold.
For Kant matter was deﬁned as that which ﬁlls a space and resists penetration. Hence the sentence
“Bodies are impenetrable” would enjoy – I contend – a status that is akin to our contemporary
theoretical identity statements about gold and water.
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becoming, and how I see both of them at work in two further kinds of
nomic necessity that Kant seems to be subscribing to.
If one is asking not whether a concept is the ground for inferring
another concept, but rather “how a thing is the ground of other things,”
that is, how it is possible that “if one thing is posited, the other can be
determined by it” (29:809), one must turn to metaphysics rather than
logic. Thus, real grounds (properly speaking) capture an entirely diﬀerent
class of lawlike claims: those where, if a ground is posited as a cause, a
consequence follows as an eﬀect, and not just logically or conceptually but
existentially.10 Kant calls a real ground qua cause “the ground of becoming
<ratio ﬁendi>,” not to be confused with the ground of being ratio essendi
as “the ground of that which belong to a thing considered according to its
possibility, for example, the three sides in the triangle are the ground of the
three corners” (ibid.).
I take Kant’s ratio essendi to denote essential properties of things. For
example, it is an essential property of triangles to have three sides, and once
that is posited the possibility of three corners is also posited because they
are both properties that pertain to the essence of triangles.
Using modern notation,11 one might be tempted to write Kant’s ratio
essendi as follows: ⃞xp, namely, p obtains in virtue of what it is to be x.
Grounds of being as ratio essendi capture not just geometrical claims such
as the one above about triangles. But – I contend – they capture any
lawlike claim that pertains to the possible determinations of the essence of a
thing. In Metaphysik L1 (one of Kant’s early sets of lecture notes from the
mid-1770s) Kant distinguished between the nature of a thing and the
essence of a thing:
The inner ground [of that] which belongs to the actuality of a thing is
nature, but what belongs to the possibility and to the concept of the thing is
essence. A triangle has no nature, for it is no actuality, but rather only shape,
thus in all of geometry there is no nature . . . The essence of a body is that
which belongs to its concept; but nature [is that] by which all phenomena
can be explained. What is general in the nature of bodies, what contains the
10 “The two concepts of ground and consequence are logical but not transcendental. Cause and eﬀects
are things. Cause is that out of which the existence of another follows. Existence is not at all
discussed in logic” (29:809).
11 For this notation, see Fine 1994, 2012; Correia 2011; and Rosen 2010. In modern wording, one would
read the grounding operator ⃞xp as follows: “it lies in the nature of x that p.” But since Kant – as
I am going to clarify below – sharply distinguished between the essence of things and the nature of
things, to avoid terminological confusion between Kant’s vocabulary and the modern one, let us
read the grounding operator ⃞xp as “p obtains in virtue of what it is to be x.” See Chapter 7 in this
volume for additional textual evidence about Kant’s view on the “nature” of a thing.
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principle of all phenomena, is very little, namely impenetrability, connec-
tion, and shape. (28:211)
In Metaphysik L2 (written in 1790–1791, around twenty years after Meta-
physik L1) Kant further elucidates the diﬀerence between a logical essence as
“the ﬁrst ground of all logical predicates of a thing” and a real essence as “the
ﬁrst ground of all determinations of an essence” (28:553). While logical
essences require the analysis of all predicates that lie in any given concept,
real essences are found through the principles of synthesis and are “the ﬁrst
inner ground of all that which belongs to the matter itself”:
The real essence is not the essence of the concept, but rather of the matter.
E.g., the predicate of impenetrability belongs to the existence of a body.
Now I observe through experience much that belongs to its existence; e.g.
extension in space, resistance against other bodies, etc. Now the inner
ground of all this is the nature of the thing. We can infer the inner principle
only from the properties known to us; therefore the real essence of things is
inscrutable to us, although we cognize many essential aspects. We become
acquainted with the powers of things bit by bit in experience. (28:553).
Thus, although we can never know the real essences of things, we
become familiar with “the powers of things bit by bit” in experience.
We come to cognize by experience essential properties or determinations
that belong to the existence of a body, for example, that bodies resist
penetration from other bodies and attract other bodies too. From these
properties or determinations known to us, we infer the “inner ground,”
or what Kant calls the “nature of the thing.” Thus, from fermentations
and chemical and optical phenomena that Kant was well familiar with
and to which he repeatedly referred in Universal Natural History, On
Fire, Physical Monadology, and again Metaphysical Foundations, we come
to infer that there must be a repulsive force as a power that allows
bodies to resist penetration, saltpeter to burn in the bowels of the Sun,
winds to form when there is a decrease in the expansive force of the air,
and so on.12
In a quasi-Kripkean fashion, a theoretical identity statement such as
(ii***) would then display a kind of necessity, which is better called
metaphysical necessity because it is grounded in the essential determinations
or powers of matter. I take Kant’s “ground of being” qua ratio essendi to
support two (weak and strong) modal claims:
12 For details about Kant’s take on repulsive force in these phenomena, see Massimi 2011. For an
analysis of Kant’s notion of “nature” of things and its relation to explanatory laws, see Ameriks’s
(2012) treatment in the chapter “Kant and the End of Theodicy.”
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Ratio essendi weak modal claim:
Given an essential property F that obtains in virtue of what it is to be x (qua
ground of being), positing x metaphysically grounds the possibility of F.
For example, given that having three corners is an essential property that
obtains in virtue of what it is to be a triangle x (qua ground of being),
whenever we posit x, we posit also the possibility of having three corners.
Or, to use a diﬀerent example, given that resisting penetration is for Kant an
essential property that obtains in virtue of what it is to bematter x (qua ground
of being), by positing x the possibility of impenetrability F is also posited.13
Kant would presumably endorse an even stronger claim whereby,
whenever the ground of being for triangles is posited, necessarily the
possibility of the essential property of three corners is also posited. Simi-
larly, whenever the ground of being for matter is posited, necessarily the
possibility of the essential property of impenetrability is posited with it:
Ratio essendi strong modal claim:
Given essential property F that obtains in virtue of what it is to be x (qua
ground of being), it is necessary that positing x metaphysically grounds the
possibility of F.
I take the Ratio essendi strong modal claim to be at work in theoretical
identity statements such as “Water is H2O,” or “Gold is element with
atomic number 79,” or, closer to Kant, “Triangles have three corners” or
“Bodies are impenetrable.” Theoretical identity statements are necessary a
posteriori because the fact that it is in the essence of material bodies to resist
penetration metaphysically grounds the possibility of impenetrability, and
necessarily so (according to the Ratio essendi strong modal claim).
Things get complicated with real grounds qua causes or rationes ﬁendi. In
light of Kant’s aforementioned distinction between essence and nature, Kant
seems to be suggesting that if something obtains in virtue of what it is to be a
real ground qua ratio ﬁendi, then it is not just the possibility of some essential
property F that is grounded in the obtaining of the ground x (and
necessarily so). Instead, by positing the real ground, a whole host of lawful
13 The ratio essendi weak modal claim does not contend that the possibility of F is included in actuality
of x (or better, in the actuality of what it is to be x). It simply tells us that if F obtains in virtue of
what it is to be x, then positing this essentialist claim metaphysically grounds the possibility of F.
Whether or not there exists a ground in actuality that indeed metaphysically grounds the possibility
of F falls outside the scope of what the ratio essendi weak (and strong) modal claims can ever teach
us. As we will see shortly, telling us whether or not there exists such a ground is the job of the ratio
ﬁendi’s ﬁrst modal move.
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phenomena are causally grounded, and necessarily so. This necessity of
synthetic connections, Kant adds, is baﬄing. No human reason can com-
prehend it, and it cannot be grasped by experience either: “That which the
real ground contains of something is called cause. I can not comprehend the
concept of real ground from experience; for it contains a necessity” (28:549).
What kind of necessity do real grounds (rationes ﬁendi) deliver?
It is not the conceptual necessity licensed by logical grounds, because
the principle of causality bridges antecedents and consequents in lawlike
claims synthetically, that is, without the concept of the consequent being
already included in the concept of the ground. It is not metaphysical
necessity either, licensed by grounds of being or rationes essendi, because
the necessity of “grounds of becoming” undergirds lawlike claims that are
not conﬁned to the possible essential determinations of things (and neces-
sarily so; e.g., matter being impenetrable, and necessarily so). Instead, the
necessity of “grounds of becoming” undergirds lawlike claims that go from
the actual obtaining of something qua cause to the actual obtaining of
something else qua eﬀect in nature.
Real grounds qua rationes ﬁendi then capture modal connections,
whereby the real ground is a causal ground for the necessary occurrence
of the consequent: facts featured in the antecedent of the “if . . . then”
claim are causal grounds for the consequent facts obtaining. This kind of
necessity is neither conceptual nor metaphysical. It is natural, I contend.14
For real connections to be naturally necessary is for them to be true in virtue
of what Kant calls the “nature of the things” (and not the essence of the
things, since for Kant essences give only the grounds for the possibility of
things, but natures give grounds for the actuality of things). For example:
(iii*) Necessarily, if the Earth has attractive force, then the Earth has a
spherical shape.
(iii**) Necessarily, if air has repulsive force, then air produces winds.
These statements are necessary because – to Kant’s eyes – the consequent
obtains in virtue of positing attractive or repulsive forces that cause the Earth
to acquire its spherical shape, or cause air to produce winds, respectively.
And attractive and repulsive forces are essential properties or powers that
belong to the nature of matter. While the necessity associated with logical
grounds is what I have called conceptual necessity, and the necessity
14 Natural necessity is not one and the same as metaphysical necessity, for the latter subdivides into
other nonnatural kinds of necessity, such as normative necessity (for a classic contemporary
treatment, see Fine 2002).
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associated with grounds of being, or rationes essendi, is what I have called
metaphysical necessity, I contend that the necessity that is to be found in
most empirical causal laws is the natural necessity typical of real grounds qua
rationes ﬁendi.
Equipped with this threefold distinction of grounds qua ratio cognos-
cendi, ratio essendi, and ratio ﬁendi, and their respective kinds of necessity,
we can go back to the metaphysical quandary associated with the Kantian
problem of inference and provide an answer to it on Kant’s behalf.
8.3 Solving the Kantian Problem of Inference: Causal Grounds
and Their Triple Modal Move
Recall the metaphysical quandary. Kant’s famous claim about the
understanding prescribing laws to nature seems prima facie to conﬁne
lawfulness to phenomena as objects of possible experience. Thus, it would
seem that the understanding prescribes laws to nature in a purely formal
sense (qua natura formaliter spectata), but not in any material sense, that is,
in the sense of delivering on the promise of nomic necessity that would
easily answer the question about how laws of nature can possibly have a
purchase on nature itself.
The analysis in the previous section makes us well equipped to go back
to this quandary and oﬀer a possible solution to it. Laws of nature – I argue
on Kant’s behalf – have a purchase on nature itself because they express the
way in which once real grounds are posited, consequences necessarily
follow. Real essences are inscrutable to us (hence the lawfulness of things
in themselves goes beyond the boundaries of our experience). Yet we do
cognize many essential properties or determinations of things, or what
Kant also calls “the powers of things,” such as attractive and repulsive
forces. These powers of things, or essential determinations that belong to
the existence of matter, are rooted in real grounds qua causal grounds for
the consequent facts obtaining.
Under the broadly dispositional essentialist reading that I am going to
suggest on Kant’s behalf,15 Kant would be concerned with how some
essential properties or powers – grounded in the “nature of things” qua
real grounds (rationes ﬁendi)16 – result in laws of nature that have a
15 This reading follows up on Massimi 2014. For a further dispositional essentialist reading of Kant and
laws, along lines that are slightly diﬀerent from mine, see Chapter 7 in this volume.
16 On my reading here, the “natures” of things (or rationes ﬁendi) are not one and the same as the causal
powers of things. Instead they ground the latter, in the sense of providing metaphysical grounding for
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purchase on nature itself via a triple modal move. Kant calls these essential
properties “essentialia” (28:553) or, alternatively, “the powers of things,”
and he takes attractive and repulsive forces as the two main examples. He is
committed to the view that these essential properties or powers are not
quiddities, whose identity is primitive and cannot be further explained or
grounded in anything else.17 Instead, he seems to suggest that those
essential properties or powers have an “inner ground” or what he inter-
changeably calls a “real ground,” which is in turn the “nature of the thing”
(I am going to call it z to distinguish it from ground of being x), whose
role – I take it – is to metaphysically ground these essential properties.18
Hence, Kant’s view is essentialist in bringing in the “nature of the thing”
with the following ﬁrst modal move, which I am going to call the Ratio
ﬁendi ﬁrst modal move:
Ratio ﬁendi ﬁrst modal move:
There exists a real ground z such that essential property or power F obtains
in virtue of what it is to be z. Hence, by positing z as a real ground, essential
property, or power, F is also determinately posited.
For example, there exists a real ground z of, say, matter such that all
material bodies have the power of resisting penetration.19 This ﬁrst modal
move captures the metaphysical necessity of essential properties or powers
F, which for Kant are not quiddities but have an inner ground/real ground
essential determinations or powers of things. Hence the ﬁrst essentialist component of my triple modal
move here.
17 Thus, Kant’s view diﬀers from what is now called categoricalism, i.e., the view that underlies
contemporary Humean metaphysics à la Lewis no less than Necessitarian accounts such as
Armstrong’s. Categoricalism maintains that the fundamental natural properties are categorical,
rather than dispositional: their identity is deﬁned by a quiddity, not by their possible causal roles
(as in the case of dispositions). Categorical properties may be instantiated in nature with very diﬀerent
causal roles, without yet losing their identity, which is secured by quidditism. Hence the laws of nature
where categorical properties feature are metaphysically contingent. That is not the case with
dispositional essentialism: a dispositional essential property is always instantiated with the same
causal role (no matter what the actual manifestations are) because it is identiﬁed by such a role (and
not by some nonexplicable quiddity). For an excellent introduction see Choi and Fara (2016).
18 I take it that both rationes ﬁendi and rationes essendi have the primary task of metaphysically
grounding essential properties, but with two main diﬀerences. First, rationes essendi metaphysically
ground the possibility of essential properties, whereas rationes ﬁendi metaphysically ground the
actuality of essential properties (recall the diﬀerence Kant draws between essence and nature).
Second, and related to my ﬁrst point, the class of essential properties whose possibility is
metaphysically grounded by rationes essendi is larger than the class of essential properties whose
actuality is metaphysically grounded by rationes ﬁendi (e.g., the former includes geometrical
properties such as triangularity, among others).
19 I take Kant to be subscribing to this ﬁrst modal move because he takes real grounds as grounds of
actuality and not just grounds for the possibility of some essential properties (recall quotes 28:211 and
28:553).
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z in what he calls the “nature of the thing.” To reiterate: Kant does not
identify real grounds (z) and essential properties (or powers) (F). Nor does
he consider essential properties as sheer predicates that can be attributed to
things. Real grounds qua rationes ﬁendi metaphysically ground the actuality
(and not just the possibility) of essential properties or powers – this is what
the Ratio ﬁendi ﬁrst modal move tells us. But we are not simply interested
in the metaphysical necessity with which essential properties or powers are
actually posited, whenever real grounds are posited. What is distinctive and
unique about real grounds qua causes are the further modal claims they
make possible.
Indeed, not only is Kant endorsing the Ratio ﬁendi ﬁrst modal move
concerning essentialism about properties or powers. He is also endorsing –
I contend – a further modal claim that explicates the properly dispositional
nature of his essentialism.20 Following dispositional essentialism as the view
that an essentially dispositional property manifests a given behavior in the
presence of the right stimulus condition,21 I suggest that we understandKant’s
argument as implicitly buying into the following dispositionalist modal move:
Ratio ﬁendi second modal move:
There exists a real ground z such that it is in virtue of z that each object a
that has it also has the essential property or power F (as per the Ratio ﬁendi
ﬁrst modal move); and this fact, in turn, causally grounds the dispositional
behavior D of any object a.
For example, the elasticity of material bodies a1 . . . an is a disposition D
that is causally grounded in the repulsive force as an essential power F that
lies in the real ground z of any material body a.
Kant clearly saw the relation between real grounds, essential properties
or powers, and their manifestations along these dispositionalist essentialist
lines. Real grounds pertaining to the nature of things undergird powers
that in turn causally ground dispositional behavior D. For example, repul-
sive force as an essential determination of matter is manifested in “the self-
same elasticity and pressure of the air,” which is in turn “of necessity the
20 Here I fully endorse Barbara Vetter’s 2012 distinction between (1) some fundamental properties are
essential, and (2) some of these essential properties are dispositional. E.g., the essential property of
having three sides for triangles is not dispositional, but the essential property of repulsive force for
material bodies is dispositional.
21 According to a sophisticated conditional analysis of dispositions, object a has a disposition D to
manifest M in the presence of the right stimulus condition S iﬀ a has some essential property (or
power F) that would cause a to manifest M in the presence of S (for this conditional analysis of
dispositions, see Lewis 1997). I return to the importance of M and S below in the ratio ﬁendi
third move.
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ground of the possibility of pumps, of the generation of clouds, of the
maintenance of ﬁre, of the winds, and so on. It is necessary that, as soon as
the ground of even merely one of them be present, the ground of the others
should also be present” (OPA 2:106, emphasis added). In other words, as
soon as we posit repulsive force (F) as a power that lies in the nature of a
thing (or in its real ground z), we will see F causing the dispositional
behaviour of elasticity (D) that is at work in many eﬀects wherever z is
present (i.e., the generation of the clouds, the maintenance of ﬁre, the
production of the winds, and so forth).
Following a long tradition that goes back to Newton and Hales, among
others,22 Kant thought, for example, that the repulsive force was an
essential power that belonged to the existence of air. Along similar lines
in the Metaphysical Foundations, he declared, “The expansive force of a
matter is also called elasticity. Now, since it is the basis [Grund] on which
the ﬁlling of space rests, as an essential property of all matter, this elasticity
must therefore be called original, because it can be derived from no other
property of matter. All matter is therefore originally elastic” (MF 4:500).
Similarly for attraction: “The attraction essential to all matter is an immedi-
ate action of matter on other matter through empty space . . . This original
attractive force contains the very ground of the possibility of matter, as that
thing which ﬁlls a space to a determinate degree, and so contains even [the
ground] of the possibility of a physical contact thereof” (MF 4:512).
Finally, to complete Kant’s response to the metaphysical quandary, we
need a further modal claim that links dispositional essential properties
(e.g., the elasticity due to the repulsive force or the action at a distance
due to the attractive force) with their very many manifestations in nature.
To achieve this goal, I suggest that we unpack the Ratio ﬁendi second
modal move to allow for what Alexander Bird (2007), following Gilbert
Ryle, calls “multi-track dispositions,” that is, dispositions D(S,M)a that
have various manifestation conditions M under slightly varied stimuli
conditions S:23
Ratio ﬁendi third modal move:
There exists a real ground z for essential property or power F, which
causally grounds the dispositional behavior D of any object a having z as
22 For details, see Massimi 2011.
23 Multi-track dispositions have more than one pair of manifestation M and stimulus S condition
(although they must share the same notion of stimulus condition). Being elastic is an example of a
multi-track disposition because it can have more than one pair. Its stimulus condition can be being
released, being stretched, being pulled, being twisted. Its manifestation condition can be being
inﬂated, being bounced back, being squidgy, being resistant, and so on.
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its real ground and F as an essential power, so that in diﬀerent stimuli
conditions S, diﬀerent manifestations M of disposition D occur.
Under slightly varied stimuli conditions Sa1 . . . San, the repulsive force F –
as a multiply instantiable essential power grounded in z – displays a multi-
track disposition D(S,M)a, that is, elasticity (depending on whether it is the
elasticity released by the atmospheric air, the elasticity inherent in colliding
balls, or the elasticity of a stretched spring, and so on). This multi-track
disposition necessarily yields a variety of manifestations M. For example,
Ma1, that is, winds are produced when elasticity decreases and causes
alteration in the equilibrium of the atmosphere;24 Ma2, that is, ﬁre burns
when elastic air is released by saltpeter in the bowels of the Sun;25 Ma3, that
is, a spring recoils when its elastic material is being pulled; and so forth.
What all these diﬀerent phenomena share is a common real ground z in
virtue of which an essential power F obtains (e.g., repulsive force), such
that F causally grounds a multi-track disposition D(S,M)a (e.g., elasticity),
which under diﬀerent stimuli conditions necessarily brings about diﬀerent
manifestations M.
To sum up, the three modal moves I have suggested are designed to
deliver a three-tier causal basis for multi-track dispositions in Kant’s
metaphysics. Real grounds are the ﬁrst tier. Essential properties or powers
F are the second tier. Multi-track dispositions are the third tier.26 More to
the point, the essential properties or powers of the second tier are not
sparse categorical properties, because (1) Kant rejects quidditism and
grounds these properties in real grounds (as per Ratio ﬁendi ﬁrst modal
move). Moreover, (2) Kant identiﬁes these essential properties or powers
with their causal roles in bringing about multi-track dispositions (as per
Ratio ﬁendi second and third modal moves). As for real grounds them-
selves, they are neither categorical nor dispositional properties – indeed
they are not properties at all but instead grounds for powers (and ultim-
ately for the dispositions that supervene on them).
24 In his 1756 Theory of the Winds the cause of the winds was itself identiﬁed with the “decrease of the
expansive force by cold and vapors that reduce the elasticity of the air” (1:491).
25 In Universal Natural History, Kant described elasticity or, better, “elastic air” as “capable of
maintaining the most violent degrees of ﬁre” in the atmosphere of the sun (1:325–326).
26 According to an inﬂuential view by Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson (1982), dispositions have a causal
basis, which is typically constituted by a set of properties. Whenever an object has this set of
essential properties and is in the right stimulus condition, it is causally necessary that the object
manifests dispositional behavior D. Critics have objected that if the causal work of necessitating the
manifested behavior is done by the causal basis of properties, dispositions are causally inert and
redundant. I hint at an answer to this objection below (at least in the context of my analysis of
Kant’s view).
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If this analysis is correct, a new picture emerges about Kant’s view on
the necessity of laws. For multi-track dispositions are ultimately grounded
on real grounds all the way down. Moreover, it is this three-tier structure
of real grounds, essential properties or powers, and dispositions that
ultimately cause (and necessarily so) the stimulus–manifestation pairs.
The essential power of repulsion (in and of itself) neither causally explains
nor necessitates that saltpeter should burn inside the Sun or that winds
should form by decreasing the elasticity of the air. For any stimulus–
manifestation pair, the three-tier system of real grounds, essential powers,
and multi-track dispositions must be present.27 And it is this three-tier
system that ultimately makes laws of nature necessary and part of a uniﬁed
system of laws, I contend.
We are now equipped to go back and solve the metaphysical quandary
and explain why, on Kant’s account, laws have a purchase on nature and
can necessitate states of aﬀairs, despite the fact that the understanding
prescribes laws to nature in a purely formal way (qua natura formaliter
spectata). How does the inference from (I) to (V) proceed?
(I) All alterations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of
cause and eﬀect (Second Analogy).
(II) Event of type A (e.g., alignment of the Moon and the Earth) causes
event of type B (e.g., high tide occurring – empirical causal law).
(III) Event A1 causes event B1 (e.g., this particular Moon–Earth align-
ment today causes high tides at Cramond Island at 11:35 a.m. –
instantiated empirical causal law).
(IV) A1 occurs.
(V) B1 necessarily follows (necessity of eﬀects, via I, II, and III).
On the reading I have been suggesting, we should understand empirical
causal laws in (II) as instantiations of the principle of causality in (I),
where, by experiments and observations, we learn how to ﬁll in the
general template of cause–eﬀect relation oﬀered by the Second Analogy
of Experience (I) with real grounds and their essential powers (e.g.,
attractive force and repulsive force). These, in turn, causally ground
dispositions D that we see manifested in nature in a variety of
27 A bonus of my present analysis is that it defuses the aforementioned objection about the causal
ineﬃcacy of dispositions. For it is not the case that all the causal work is done by the causal basis of
properties leaving dispositions redundant. The causal basis of essential properties or powers is itself
metaphysically grounded in real grounds. And it is only via the triple ratio ﬁendi modal move here
described that stimulus–manifestation pairs occur and the empirical causal laws associated with
them acquire nomological strength.
Grounds, Modality, and Nomic Necessity in the Critical Kant 165
phenomena (e.g., balls colliding, ﬁre burning, winds forming, and so on).
That is why Kant says that empirical causal laws cannot be completely
derived from the faculty of understanding (although they “stand under
it”) and that experience is required instead to learn the “powers of things
bit by bit.” Moreover, experience is required to ﬁll in the details of how,
under diﬀerent stimuli conditions Sa1 . . . San, the multi-track disposition
D(S,M)a yields diﬀerent manifestations Ma1 . . . Man in the Ratio ﬁendi
third modal move.
More precisely, experience enters (II) via the Ratio ﬁendi second modal
move where we learn by experience and observation about these powers
and conclude that there exists a real ground z for them.28 Thus, the
inference from
(I) All alterations occur in accordance with the law of the connection
of cause and eﬀect (Second Analogy).
to
(II) Event of type A (e.g., alignment of the Moon and the Earth)
causes event of type B (e.g., high tide occurring – empirical
causal law).
takes place by ﬁlling in the general causal template in (I) (i.e., “All
alterations occur . . .”) with the details of a speciﬁc power F (e.g., attractive
force in this example) – and the existence of z as its real ground (i.e., the
“nature” of mass) – which causally grounds the dispositional behavior Da1
of massive bodies (e.g., Earth and Moon) to attract each other, as per the
Ratio ﬁendi second modal move. Experience teaches us what speciﬁc kind
of cause–eﬀect connection (e.g., attraction between the Earth’s mass and
the Moon’s mass) is in place when we observe alterations in the low and
high tides at Cramond beach. Experience does not tell us that the alter-
ations are necessary, of course. Nor does the Second Analogy tell us that
either (if not in some weak, transcendental sense that does not solve the
Kantian problem of inference). The necessity of the eﬀects must then
come from somewhere else.
Experience and observation enter also (III) via the Ratio ﬁendi third
modal move, where by experience we learn how to track multiple eﬀects
28 The Ratio ﬁendi ﬁrst modal move is somehow included into the Ratio ﬁendi second modal move,
because its role is that of expressing the essentialist nature of these dispositional properties, which are
not quiddities. As such, Ratio ﬁendi ﬁrst modal move does not itself feature in the inference from (I)
to (II).
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under a common power F and its multi-track disposition D that we see
manifested in various events M in nature. In other words, the inference
from (II) to (III) “Event A1 causes event B1” (e.g., this particular Moon–
Earth alignment today causes high tides at Cramond Island at 11:35 a.m. –
instantiated empirical causal law) takes place by ﬁlling in the speciﬁc
stimulus conditions Sa1 . . . San under which the power F may ﬁnd itself
operating (e.g., no interference due to another massive planetary object in
the Moon–Earth alignment; positions of the Sun and the Moon relative to
the Earth today; position of the Moon with respect to the Earth’s equator
today, and so on). Once these stimuli conditions are “ﬁlled in,” necessarily
high tide at Cramond Island occurs at 11:35 a.m. today (Ma1), as premise
(III) says, via the Ratio ﬁendi third modal move. By the same token,
necessarily the Earth’s rotational velocity decreases over millions of years
(Ma2); necessarily coastal lines and ocean depths in both hemispheres are
aﬀected over centuries (Ma3); and so forth. That is where the necessity of
eﬀects ultimately comes from: from the triple modal move of Kant’s
dispositional essentialism.
From these diverse manifestations of a multi-track disposition by simple
modus ponens, whenever the right stimulus condition Sa1 is present
(premise IV), the manifestation Ma1 necessarily follows (necessity of
eﬀects – conclusion V). The nomic necessity of most empirical laws, under
this dispositional essentialist reading of Kant, is nothing but the expression
of the natural necessity through which real grounds, and their powers qua
dispositional essential properties, causally determine a variety of conse-
quences in nature.
If this interpretation is on the right track, it might go some way toward
explaining Kant’s emphasis on the unity and systematic order of nature,
according to which, once a real ground is posited for some eﬀect (e.g.,
saltpeter’s combustion inside the Sun), the ground of other eﬀects (e.g.,
the production of winds) is posited too.
A dispositional essentialist reading of Kant on laws can solve at once the
problem with the seemingly mysterious inference from (I) to (V). For it
explains the necessity of the eﬀects in nature via the triple modal move
captured by the essentialist, the dispositional, and ﬁnally the multi-track
dispositions associated with real grounds. The understanding prescribes
laws to nature by providing templates of cause–eﬀect (but also others, e.g.,
persistence of substance at work in the conservation of mass) that by
experience and observation we learn how to “ﬁll in” with dispositional
powers, their inferred real grounds, and necessary consequences. Empir-
ical causal laws prescribe the way nature ought to be by capturing natural
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necessities in the manifested behavior of real grounds qua dispositional
essential properties of things, whose ultimate real essences remain
unknown to us. That is why, despite the lawfulness of things in them-
selves being precluded to us, the lawfulness of appearances is more than
just a projected or injected lawfulness. It is instead a robust lawfulness
undergirded by nature’s real grounds, their powers, and related modal
claims.
8.4 Concluding Remarks
The main goal of this chapter was to advance an interpretation that could
vindicate Kant’s bold claim that the understanding prescribes laws to
nature. To this end, I have elucidated the metaphysical aspect of the
dispositional essentialist reading that I am defending on Kant’s behalf with
an eye to clarifying diﬀerent kinds of necessity that Kant seems to be
referring to in various passages of the lectures on metaphysics. We identi-
ﬁed three main notions of necessity (conceptual, metaphysical, and natural
necessity, respectively). They are, respectively, at work in conceptual
truths, theoretical identity statements, and empirical causal laws, via three
diﬀerent kinds of grounds (ratio cognoscendi, essendi, and ﬁendi). This
taxonomy is far from exhaustive and is meant only to map out (tentatively)
the territory of lawlike claims and their necessity in Kant.
The nomic necessity at play in the majority of empirical laws of nature,
I have claimed, is natural necessity captured by real ground–consequence
relations. I have clariﬁed three modal moves that are involved in the way in
which real grounds qua rationes ﬁendi bring about their eﬀects in the
harmonious and essential order of nature, an order that is ultimately
subsumed under God, yet nomically independent of Him, to Kant’s
eyes.29
The metaphysical quandary of the problem of inference evaporates at
once. The faculty of understanding has a purchase on nature because it
provides general templates under which stand many empirical laws.
And, crucially for my story, these laws capture the natural necessities
with which dispositional essentialist properties bring about their eﬀects.
29 “The forces of nature and the causal laws which govern them, contain the ground of an order of
nature. This order of nature, in so far as it embraces a complex harmony in a necessary unity, has the
eﬀect of turning the combination of much perfection in one ground into a law. Thus, diﬀerent
natural eﬀects are, in respect of their beauty and usefulness, to be regarded as subsumed under the
essential order of nature, and, by that means, as subsumed under God” (OPA 2:107). On this point,
see Massimi 2014.
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Thus, nomic necessity qua natural necessity supervenes on nature’s
essential powers and their dispositional behavior. While the underpin-
ning metaphysics of my reading of Kant on laws is dispositional
essentialist, it should also be clear that for us to cognize the necessity
of the laws, that is, to stumble into empirical regularities and identify
them as modally robust (as we expect laws of nature to be), they ought
to stand under the laws of the understanding and “ﬁll in” the general
templates provided by the System of the Principles.
Kant knew that Humean regularities are where one wants to ﬁnd
them. What makes some of them laws of nature (while others are not)
is precisely the fact that some of them are undergirded by grounds and
their necessary eﬀects, while accidentally true ones are not.30 The Ratio
ﬁendi triple modal move presented in Section 8.3 shows how to move
from general principles of the understanding to instantiated empirical
laws, whose necessity is not “injected” or downstream to the necessity
of the principles themselves. It is instead grounded in the natures of the
things and their dispositional essentialist powers, which we come to
know “bit by bit” by experience.31
Turning to the epistemological quandary, we can cognize the necessity
of empirical causal laws (which is derived neither a priori from the
understanding nor a posteriori by experience), because these laws “stand
under” the formal template of causality, under which only it is possible
for us to carve nature’s empirical manifold according to modally robust
regularities. The quandary was based on erroneously conﬂating the
necessity (qua Postulate of Empirical Thinking) that attaches to
the principle of causality, with the nomic necessity that – under my
interpretive reading – Kant saw as natural necessity under a
dispositional essentialist view of real grounds. The former provides
only necessary rules for ordering our representations according to
cause–eﬀect. The latter is evidenced by the plurality of eﬀects traceable
to the same real ground in nature.32
30 “But there are cases where something is posited, and another thing is posited after, yet where the
one is not a ground of the other. E.g., when the stork comes, good weather follows. But to posit
[ponere] does not mean something follows the other accidentally; for the stork could also be brought
on the mail coach” (28:549).
31 Hence my metaphysical picture of powers and natural necessity diﬀers in signiﬁcant ways from
Friedman’s reading of causal laws whose necessity is injected from the necessity of the Second
Analogy and, more generally, of the principles of the understanding as constitutive a priori for our
experience of nature (see Friedman 2014 and Chapter 10 in this volume).
32 My account of natural necessity would then be compatible with readings of Kant that place
emphasis on the principle of systematicity (esp. in the third Critique) as a way of understanding
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What ultimately allows us to encounter nature as ordered, lawful, and
harmonious is our ability to cognize (neither the essences nor the nature of
things but) the multifarious manifestations of the powers of things “bit by
bit.” The faculty of understanding, I suggest, oﬀers nomological cookie-
cutters with which we learn how to carve out the empirical manifold at its
joints, namely along the lines of its natural necessities. In this sense, and in
this sense only, I conclude, can Kant successfully (and nontrivially) claim
that our understanding prescribes laws to nature, a nature that never ends to
manifest itself as ordered, lawful, and harmonious in its seasonal and daily
regularities.
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why particular regularities count as laws (insofar as they are part of a system of empirical laws). Yet
I part ways with these readings because I do not see the nomic necessity of the empirical laws as itself
a consequence of being part of a system of laws (for reasons that I discuss elsewhere; see Massimi,
forthcoming). Thus, I share with these readings of systematicity the idea that lawlikeness (if
understood as an epistemic feature of cognizing some regularities as laws) might well be a function
of them being part of a system of laws. E.g., our ability to cognize the attraction between the Earth
and the Moon as lawlike in causing tides has to do with us having a system of Newtonian mechanics
in place; in another world w0 where no such system were in place, the same phenomenon could not
be cognized as lawlike. But I diverge from these readings of systematicity in contending that the
lawfulness (understood as a metaphysical feature of why some regularities are indeed laws of nature)
has nothing to do with them being part of a system of laws. According to the view defended in this
chapter, in another world w0 where Newton’s system were not in place, the attraction between the
Earth and the Moon would still be lawful for Kant, because it would still be the expression of the
natural necessity with which once gravity is posited, tidal eﬀects necessarily occur.
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